Singapore, September 2016
The container ship Hanjin Rome is unable to sail due to a court order. The crew is not allowed to go ashore. On board are people and cargo that someone ordered, paid for, and is waiting for. The ship is stuck because it has been detained in a dispute over the shipowner's debts.
At the same time, another ship from the same line, sailing through the South China Sea, has been at sea for twelve days. The captain told The Wall Street Journal: "We usually have food and water for about two weeks." He is rationing water and limiting air conditioning.
After Hanjin lost liquidity, the retrieval of containers depended on settlements with the terminals holding them and on securing legal protection for the ships against seizure by creditors. Consignees had to cover additional costs to release their containers, and in Rotterdam, a dispute arose over double-charged THC. Sometimes, it was more cost-effective to abandon the cargo.
August 30th
On August 30, 2016, banks led by the state-owned Korea Development Bank rejected Hanjin Shipping's restructuring plan as insufficient. The following day, August 31, Hanjin filed for bankruptcy protection with the Seoul Central District Court.
Hanjin was South Korea's largest container shipping line and the seventh largest in the world. It held approximately 3% of the world's container shipping capacity.
The application was filed with the court on Wednesday. By the very next day, reports emerged of ships being refused service by ports.
Ninety-seven ships
Two weeks after the filing, 75 of Hanjin's 97 ships still had cargo on board (according to Seatrade, citing Alphaliner). The Wall Street Journal estimated the value of the cargo stuck in transit at approximately $14 billion.
A port that accepts a ship from a bankrupt carrier must face the fact that no one will pay for the docking, unloading, and storage. The carrier, in turn, must worry about ships being seized by creditors in ports where there is no effective legal protection. For a captain, it is therefore safer to stay at sea than to enter a port.
The Hanjin Scarlet, carrying nearly 800 containers, waited for weeks about 28 miles off Prince Rupert, Canada. It did not enter Vancouver until late October 2016, nearly two months after the carrier's collapse.
The terminal sends the bill
The ECT terminal in Rotterdam demanded 1,000 EUR from consignees for the release of a standard container and 1,500 EUR for a special one. The terminal had performed work for which the carrier would no longer pay. Therefore, the party wanting to collect their goods had to pay.
The Rotterdam court ruled these amounts unlawful. It allowed a 25 EUR administrative fee plus the actual cost of handling. Eventually, the parties agreed on a THC of 500 EUR for a standard container and 600 EUR for a special one.
In the UK, London Gateway demanded a deposit of 500 GBP for a 20' container and 700 GBP for a 40' container. The standard THC there was about 130 GBP.
The dispute did not end there. In a later case involving OTX Logistics, the same Rotterdam court deemed a fixed release fee permissible "under the circumstances."
Terminals attempted to recover handling costs that Hanjin had failed to pay. The terminal has the container, the contractor is gone, but the costs remain. The consignee has the freight invoice and ownership of the goods, but no container. In such a dispute, the party holding the container has the upper hand.
Cheaper to abandon
The darkest picture of this story emerged in Singapore, and not in September, but three months later.
According to a CLECAT statement published by PISiL in December 2016, tens of thousands of containers abandoned by consignees were sitting in the port. The release fees exceeded the value of the goods inside. The port announced that it would dispose of or sell any containers not collected by November 28 (CLECAT via PISiL).
The goods were intact and unharmed. But retrieving them cost more than they were worth.
The bill that doesn't show up in the freight rate
The day after the filing, September 1, 2016, the Shanghai–Rotterdam spot rate rose by 39% to 1,826 USD/FEU. The Shanghai–Los Angeles rate increased by 42% to 1,674 USD/FEU (Drewry WCI). This was a jump from a very low level, typical for the entire year of 2016. Anyone booking a container from China at that time paid more, though still less than in many other years.
The additional bill, however, did not end with a higher freight rate. For an importer from Asia, the price of a container from China consists of the freight rate and the counterparty risk, which is not visible in the freight quote. In 2016, this risk cost everything from additional container release fees to the entire value of the abandoned cargo.
The problem also affected exporters who needed to recover containers left at terminals. Their containers were sitting at the same terminals, waiting for the same resolutions.
The market reacted immediately. On September 1, 2016, the Polish Chamber of Forwarding and Logistics (PISiL) warned that further bookings with Hanjin could expose freight forwarders to claims of negligence in carrier selection, or even gross negligence. The warning reminded the industry that when choosing a shipping line, it is not just price and departure dates that matter. Given the carrier's obvious financial problems, it was also a matter of liability for that choice.
It is unknown how many Polish companies had goods on board Hanjin ships. It is also unclear whether its vessels called directly at Gdańsk or Gdynia. However, the mechanism was the same in Rotterdam, London, and Singapore, and a large portion of Polish imports from Asia flows through these same hubs.
An end without a rescue
In December 2016, the auditor Samil PwC concluded that liquidating Hanjin would be more beneficial than saving the company. Formal bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings began on February 17, 2017.
The world's seventh-largest shipping line disappeared from the market less than six months after banks rejected its plan. The ships returned to port.
Banks refused funding, the court accepted the filing, terminals wanted payment for their work, and creditors wanted to recover their money. Each of these decisions had its justification. And the additional costs of releasing the containers fell on the cargo owners.
When a shipping line goes bankrupt mid-voyage, the terms for releasing cargo are largely determined by whoever holds the container, within the limits set by the courts. The bill of lading, freight invoice, and proof of ownership are not enough to collect the goods in such cases.
Sources
- Restructuring GlobalView, November 2016 — Hanjin Shipping's filing for creditor protection at the Seoul Central District Court
- PISiL, 09/01/2016 — "Expected bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping"; warning regarding further bookings
- Transport Topics / Reuters, 08/30/2016 — "Seventh Largest Container Shipping Company One Step Closer to Bankruptcy" (banks led by Korea Development Bank halt support)
- Floship, 10/14/2016 — "A simple guide to understanding the Hanjin Bankruptcy" (rejection of the restructuring plan)
- SupplyChain 24/7, Sept. 2, 2016 — "Fallout from Hanjin’s bankruptcy has potential to impact ocean rates and capacity in the short-term" (the world's seventh-largest shipping line)
- PYMNTS, Sept. 8, 2016 — "Hanjin And $14 Billion Lost At Sea" (approx. 3.2% of global shipping capacity)
- The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 7, 2016 — "Hanjin Shipping’s Troubles Leave $14 Billion in Cargo Stranded at Sea" (value of cargo in transit; captain's account from the South China Sea)
- Seatrade Maritime via Alphaliner, Sept. 14, 2016 — "Hanjin Shipping bankruptcy – what happens next?" (75 out of 97 ships with cargo on board)
- Juris Magazine, Duquesne University School of Law, Oct. 29, 2016 — "Bankruptcy Disaster on the High Seas: Hanjin Shipping Forced to Anchor" (detention of the Hanjin Rome in Singapore)
- Fortune / Reuters, Oct. 28, 2016 — "Hanjin’s Bankruptcy Almost Starved This Stranded Ship Crew" (Hanjin Scarlet off the coast of Canada)
- Drewry, Sept. 1, 2016 — "Spot rates sky-rocket after Hanjin collapse" (World Container Index: Shanghai–Rotterdam and Shanghai–Los Angeles)
- The Loadstar, Sept. 6, 2016 — "Shippers demand terminals free Hanjin containers and drop huge release fees" (ECT fees in Rotterdam and court ruling)
- The Loadstar, Sept. 8, 2016 — "Terminal operators under fire from shippers over high fees for releasing Hanjin containers" (agreement in Rotterdam; deposits at London Gateway)
- Lexology — "ECT held Hanjin containers hostage" (Rotterdam court ruling of Aug. 30, 2017, in the OTX Logistics case)
- Safety4Sea, May 21, 2018 — "Terminal releases containers for a fixed fee after Hanjin bankrupts" (OTX Logistics case)
- Seatrade Maritime, Nov. 9, 2016 — "PSA Singapore gives shippers 28 November deadline to claim laden Hanjin containers"
- CLECAT via PISiL, Dec. 13, 2016 — "Hanjin Shipping: customers still waiting for their containers" (abandoned containers in Singapore)
- Supply Chain Dive, Dec. 16, 2016 — "Hanjin is better off liquidated, PwC tells Korean court" (Samil PwC opinion)
- gCaptain / Reuters, Feb. 17, 2017 — "South Korea court declares Hanjin bankrupt" (formal bankruptcy of Hanjin)
Our previous "Dark Stories" series publications
- Why do we need FOB? Dark Stories #1
- Seriously, CIF?! Dark Stories #2
- EXW as my shield? One signature and you're liable for everything: cargo, carrier damages, and potentially third parties! Dark Stories #3
- Ticking time bomb in hold number 4 - Dark Stories #4
- To copper or not to copper? - Dark Tales #5
- Your container is intact. You're paying anyway - Dark Stories #6
- Really DDP? — Dark Tales #7
- One letter, 800,000 euros, and prison sentences. Anatomy of "fake carrier fraud" - Dark Stories #8
- Not my railcar, not my fault? - Dark Stories #9
- How a loose cable sank a bridge and cost the shipowner $2.25 billion - Dark Stories #10
- Your cargo. Not your carrier - Dark Tales #11
- The evidence that went down with the ship - Dark Tales #12
- Concrete blocks at the price of copper - Dark Stories #13
- Pallet or parcel? - Dark Tales #14
- The shipowner paid the ransom. The bill went to the cargo owner anyway - Dark Stories #15
- The Yellow Fleet: eight years at a standstill, or how one war froze fifteen ships - Dark Stories #16
- How a wave of molasses killed 21 people in Boston - Dark Stories #17
- A TIR carnet with a customs stamp, and it still doesn't count - Dark Stories #18
- Free trade at gunpoint - Dark Stories #19
- Pirates ordered by the owner - Dark Stories #20
- Volcafe: coffee ruined by its own moisture. Who had to prove it? Dark Stories #21
- 110 million for the label, zero for the cargo – Dark Stories #22
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